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Abstract. A great many tools have been developed for supervised clas-
sification, ranging from early methods such as linear discriminant anal-
ysis through to modern developments such as neural networks and sup-
port vector machines. A large number of comparative studies have been
conducted in attempts to establish the relative superiority of these
methods. This paper argues that these comparisons often fail to take
into account important aspects of real problems, so that the apparent
superiority of more sophisticated methods may be something of an illu-
sion. In particular, simple methods typically yield performance almost
as good as more sophisticated methods, to the extent that the difference
in performance may be swamped by other sources of uncertainty that
generally are not considered in the classical supervised classification
paradigm.
Key words and phrases: Supervised classification, error rate, misclas-
sification rate, simplicity, principle of parsimony, population drift, se-
lectivity bias, flat maximum effect, problem uncertainty, empirical com-
parisons.
1. INTRODUCTION
In supervised classification, one seeks to construct
a rule which will allow one to assign objects to one of a
prespecified set of classes based solely on a vector
of measurements taken on those objects. Construc-
tion of the rule is based on a “design set” or “train-
ing set” of objects with known measurement vectors
and for which the true class is also known: one essen-
tially tries to extract from the design set the infor-
mation which is relevant to distinguishing between
the classes in terms of the given measurements. It
is because the classes are known for the members
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of this initial data set that the term “supervised”
is used: it is as if a “supervisor” has provided these
class labels.
Such problems are ubiquitous and, as a conse-
quence, have been tackled in several different re-
search areas, including statistics, machine learning,
pattern recognition, computational learning theory
and data mining. As a result, a tremendous vari-
ety of algorithms and models has been developed
for the construction of such rules. A partial list in-
cludes linear discriminant analysis, quadratic dis-
criminant analysis, regularized discriminant analy-
sis, the naive Bayes method, logistic discriminant
analysis, perceptrons, neural networks, radial ba-
sis function methods, vector quantization methods,
nearest neighbor and kernel nonparametric meth-
ods, tree classifiers such as CART and C4.5, sup-
port vector machines and rule-based methods. New
methods, new variants on existing methods and new
algorithms for existing methods are being developed
all the time. In addition, different methods for vari-
able selection, handling missing values and other
aspects of data preprocessing multiply the number
1
2 D. J. HAND
of tools yet further. General theoretical advances
have also been made which have resulted in im-
proved performance at predicting the class of new
objects. These include ideas such as bagging, boost-
ing and more general ensemble classifiers. Further-
more, apart from the straightforward development
of new rules, theory and practice have been devel-
oped for performance assessment. A variety of crite-
ria have been investigated, including measures based
on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and
Brier score, as well as the standard measure of mis-
classification rate. Subtle estimators of these have
been developed, such as jackknife, cross-validation
and a variety of bootstrap methods, to overcome the
potential optimistic bias which results from simply
reclassifying the design set.
An examination of recent conference proceedings
and journal articles shows that such developments
are continuing. In part this is because of new compu-
tational developments that permit the exploration
of new ideas, and in part it is because of the emer-
gence of new application domains which present new
twists on the standard problem. For example, in
bioinformatics there are often relatively few cases
but many thousands of variables. In such situations
the risk of overfitting is substantial and new classes
of tools are required. General references to work on
supervised classification include [11, 13, 33, 38, 44].
The situation to date thus appears to be one of
very substantial theoretical progress, leading to deep
theoretical developments and to increased predictive
power in practical applications. While all of these
things are true, it is the contention of this paper that
the practical impact of the developments has been
inflated; that although progress has been made, it
may well not be as great as has been suggested. The
arguments for this assertion are described in the fol-
lowing sections. They develop ideas introduced by
Hand [12, 14, 15, 18, 19] and Jamain and Hand [24].
The essence of the argument is that the improve-
ments attributed to the more advanced and recent
developments are small, and that aspects of real
practical problems often render such small differ-
ences irrelevant, or even unreal, so that the gains re-
ported on theoretical grounds, or on empirical com-
parisons from simulated or even real data sets, do
not translate into real advantages in practice. That
is, progress is far less than it appears.
These ideas are described in four steps.
First, model-fitting is a sequential process of pro-
gressive refinement, which begins by describing the
largest and most striking aspects of the data struc-
ture, and then turns to progressively smaller aspects
(stopping, one hopes, before the process begins to
model idiosyncrasies of the observed sample of data
rather than aspects of the true underlying distribu-
tion). In Section 2 we show that this means that the
large gains in predictive accuracy in classification
are won using relatively simple models at the start of
the process, leaving potential gains which decrease
in size as the modeling process is taken further. All
of this means that the extra accuracy of the more
sophisticated approaches, beyond that attained by
simple models, is achieved from “minor” aspects of
the distributions and classification problems.
Second, in Section 3 we argue that in many, per-
haps most, real classification problems the data points
in the design set are not, in fact, randomly drawn
from the same distribution as the data points to
which the classifier will be applied. There are many
reasons for this discrepancy, and some are illustrated.
It goes without saying that statements about classi-
fier accuracy based on a false assumption about the
identity of the design set distribution and the dis-
tribution of future points may well be inaccurate.
Third, when constructing classification rules, var-
ious other assumptions and choices are often made
which may not be appropriate and which may give
misleading impressions of future classifier performance.
For example, it is typically assumed that the classes
are objectively defined, with no arbitrariness or un-
certainty about the class labels, but this is some-
times not the case. Likewise, parameters are often
estimated by optimizing criteria which are not rele-
vant to the real aim of classification accuracy. Such
issues are described in Section 4 and, once again, it
is obvious that these introduce doubts about how
the claimed classifier performance will generalize to
real problems.
The phenomena with which we are concerned in
Sections 3 and 4 are related to the phenomenon of
overfitting. A model overfits when it models the de-
sign sample too closely rather than modeling the dis-
tribution from which this sample is drawn. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4 we are concerned with situations in
which the models may accurately reflect the design
distributions (so they do not underfit or overfit), but
where they fail to recognize that these distributions,
and the apparent classification problems described,
are in fact merely a single such problem drawn from
a notional distribution of problems. The real aim
might be to solve a rather different problem. One
CLASSIFIER TECHNOLOGY 3
might thus describe the issue as one of problem un-
certainty. To take a familiar example, which we do
not explore in detail in this paper because it has
been explored elsewhere, the relative costs of differ-
ent kinds of misclassification may differ and may be
unknown. A very common resolution is to assume
equal costs (Jamain and Hand [24] found that most
comparative studies of classification rules made this
assumption) and to use straightforward error rate
as the performance criterion. However, equality is
but one choice, and an arbitrary one at that, and
one which we suspect is in fact rarely appropriate.
In assuming equal costs, one is adopting a particu-
lar problem which may not be the one which is re-
ally to be solved. Indeed, things are even worse than
this might suggest, because relative misclassification
costs may change over time. Provost and Fawcett
[36] have described such situations: “Comparison of-
ten is difficult in real-world environments because
key parameters of the target environment are not
known. The optimal cost/benefit tradeoffs and the
target class priors seldom are known precisely, and
often are subject to change (Zahavi and Levin [47];
Friedman and Wyatt [8]; Klinkenberg and Thorsten
[29]). For example, in fraud detection we cannot ig-
nore misclassification costs or the skewed class dis-
tribution, nor can we assume that our estimates are
precise or static (Fawcett and Provost [6]).”
Moving on, our fourth argument is that classifi-
cation methods are typically evaluated by report-
ing their performance on a variety of real data sets.
However, such empirical comparisons, while superfi-
cially attractive, have major problems which are of-
ten not acknowledged. In general, we suggest in Sec-
tion 5 that no method will be universally superior
to other methods: relative superiority will depend
on the type of data used in the comparisons, the
particular data sets used, the performance criterion
and a host of other factors. Moreover, the relative
performance will depend on the experience the per-
son making the comparison has in using the meth-
ods, and this experience may differ between meth-
ods: researcher A may find that his favorite method
is best, merely because he knows how to squeeze the
best performance from this method.
These various arguments together suggest that an
apparent superiority in classification accuracy, ob-
tained in “laboratory conditions,” may not trans-
late to a superiority in real-world conditions and, in
particular, the apparent superiority of highly sophis-
ticated methods may be illusory, with simple meth-
ods often being equally effective or even superior in
classifying new data points.
2. MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS
This section demonstrates that the extra perfor-
mance to be achieved by more sophisticated classifi-
cation rules, beyond that attained by simple meth-
ods, is small. It follows that if aspects of the classi-
fication problem are not accurately described (e.g.,
if incorrect distributions have been used, incorrect
class definitions have been adopted, inappropriate
performance comparison criteria have been applied,
etc.), then the reported advantage of the more so-
phisticated methods may be incorrect. Later sec-
tions illustrate how some inaccuracies in the clas-
sification problem description can arise.
2.1 A Simple Example
Statistical modeling is a sequential process in which
one gradually refines the model to provide a better
and better fit to the distributions from which the
data were drawn. In general, the earlier stages in this
process yield greater improvement in model fit than
later stages. Furthermore, if one looks at the histor-
ical development of classification methods, then the
earlier approaches involve relatively simple struc-
tures (e.g., the linear forms of linear or logistic dis-
criminant analysis), while more recent approaches
involve more complicated structures (e.g., the de-
cision surfaces of neural networks or support vector
machines). It follows that the simple approaches will
have led to greater improvement in predictive per-
formance than the later approaches which are nec-
essarily trying to improve on the predictive perfor-
mance obtained by the simpler earlier methods. Put
another way, there is a law of diminishing returns.
Although this paper is concerned with supervised
classification problems, it is illuminating to examine
a simple regression case. Suppose that we have a
single response variable y which is to be predicted
from d variables (x1, . . . , xd)
T = x. Suppose also that
the correlation matrix of (xT , y)T has the form
Σ=
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
=
[
(1− ρ)I+ ρ11T τ
τ
T 1
]
(2.1)
with Σ11 = (1− ρ)I+ρ11
T , Σ12 =Σ
T
21 = τ and Σ22 =
1, where I is the d × d identity matrix,
1= (1, . . . ,1)T of length d and τ = (τ, . . . , τ)T of
length d. That is, the correlation between each pair
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of predictor variables is ρ, and the correlation be-
tween each predictor variable and the response vari-
able is τ . Suppose also that ρ, τ ≥ 0. This condition
is not necessary for the argument which follows; it
merely allows us to avoid some detail.
Let V (d) be the conditional variance of y given the
values of d predictor variables x, as above. Standard
results give this conditional variance as
V (d) = Σ22 −Σ21Σ
−1
11 Σ12.(2.2)
Using the result that
Σ−111 = [(1− ρ)I+ ρ11
T ]−1
(2.3)
=
1
1− ρ
{
I−
ρ11T
1 + (d− 1)ρ
}
[with −(d− 1)−1 < ρ< 1, so that Σ11 is positive def-
inite], leads to
V (d) = 1− τT
1
1− ρ
{
I−
ρ11T
1 + (d− 1)ρ
}
τ
(2.4)
= 1−
dτ2
1− ρ
+
ρd2τ2
(1 + (d− 1)ρ)(1− ρ)
.
From this it follows that the reduction in conditional
variance due to adding an extra predictor variable,
xd+1 (also correlated ρ with the other predictors and
τ with the response variable), is
X(d+1) = V (d)− V (d+ 1)
=
τ2
1− ρ
(2.5)
+
ρτ2
1− ρ
[
d2
1 + (d− 1)ρ
−
(d+1)2
1 + dρ
]
.
Note that the condition −(d− 1)−1 < ρ < 1 must
still be satisfied when d is increased.
Now consider two cases:
Case 1. When the predictor variables are uncor-
related, ρ= 0. From (2.5), we obtain X(d+1) = τ2.
That is, if the predictor variables are mutually un-
correlated and each has correlation τ with the re-
sponse variable, then each additional predictor re-
duces the variance of the conditional variance of y given
the predictors by τ2. [Of course, by setting ρ= 0 in
(2.4) we see that this is only possible up to d= τ−2
predictors. With this many predictors the condi-
tional variance of y given x has been reduced to
zero.]
Case 2. ρ > 0. Plots of V (d) for τ = 0.5 and for a
range of ρ values are shown in Figure 1. When there
is reasonably strong mutual correlation between the
predictor variables, the earliest ones contribute sub-
stantially more to the reduction in variance remain-
ing unexplained than do the later ones. The case
ρ = 0 consists of a diagonal straight line running
from 1 down to zero. In the case ρ= 0.9, almost all
of the variance in the response variable is explained
by the first chosen predictor.
This example shows that the reduction in con-
ditional variance of the response variable decreases
with each additional predictor we add, even though
each predictor has an identical correlation with the
response variable (provided this correlation is greater
than 0). The reason for the reduction is, of course,
the mutual correlation between the predictors: much
of the predictive power of a new predictor has al-
ready been accounted for by the existing predictors.
In real applications, the situation is generally even
more pronounced than in this illustration. Usually,
in real applications, the predictor variables are not
identically correlated with the response, and the pre-
dictors are selected sequentially, beginning with those
which maximally reduce the conditional variance. In
a sense, then, the example above provides a lower
bound on the phenomenon: in real applications the
proportion of the gains attributable to the early
steps is even greater.
2.2 Decreasing Bounds on Possible Improvement
We now return to supervised classification. For
illustrative purposes, suppose that misclassification
rate is the performance criterion, although similar
arguments apply with other criteria. Ignoring issues
of overfitting, adding additional predictor variables
can only lead to a decrease in misclassification rate.
Fig. 1. Conditional variance of response variable as addi-
tional predictors are added for τ = 0.5. A range of values of ρ
is shown.
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The simplest model is that which uses no predictors,
leading, in the two-class case, to a misclassification
rate of m0 = pi0, where pi0 is the prior probability
of the smaller class. Suppose that a predictor vari-
able is now introduced which has the effect of re-
ducing the misclassification rate to m1 <m0. Then
the scope for further improvement is only m1, which
is less than the original scope m0. Furthermore, if
m1 < m0 −m1, then all future additions necessar-
ily improve things by less than the first predictor
variable. In fact, things are even more extreme than
this: one cannot further reduce the misclassification
rate by more than m1 −mb, where mb is the Bayes
error rate. To put it another way, at each step the
maximum possible increase in predictive power de-
creases, so it is not surprising that, in general, at
each step the additional contribution to predictive
power decreases.
2.3 Effectiveness of Simple Classifiers
Although the literature contains examples of ar-
tificial data which simple models cannot separate
(e.g., intertwined spirals or checkerboard patterns),
such data sets are exceedingly rare in real life. Con-
versely, in the two-class case, although few real data
sets have exactly linear decision surfaces, it is com-
mon to find that the centroids of the predictor vari-
able distributions of the classes are different, so that
a simple linear surface can do surprisingly well as an
estimate of the true decision surface. This may not
be the same as “can do surprisingly well in classify-
ing the points,” since in many problems the Bayes
error rate is high, meaning that no decision sur-
face can separate the distributions of such problems
very well. However, it means that the dramatic steps
in improvement in classifier accuracy are made in
the simple first steps. This is a phenomenon which
has been noticed by others (e.g., Rendell and Se-
shu [37]; Shavlik, Mooney and Towell [41]; Mingers
[34]; Weiss, Galen and Tadepalli [45]; Holte [22]).
Holte [22], in particular, carried out an investigation
of this phenomenon. His “simple classifier” (called
1R) consists of a partition of a single variable, with
each cell of the partition possibly being assigned to
a different class: it is a multiple-split single-level tree
classifier. A search through the variables is used to
find that which yields the best predictive accuracy.
Holte compared this simple rule with C4.5, a more
sophisticated tree algorithm, finding that “on most
of the datasets studied, 1R’s accuracy is about 3
percentage points lower than C4’s.”
We carried out a similar analysis. Perhaps the
earliest classification method formally developed is
Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis [7]. Table 1 shows
misclassification rates for this method and for the
best performing method we could find in a search
of the literature (these data were abstracted from
the data accumulated by Jamain [23] and Jamain
and Hand [24]) for a randomly selected sample of
ten data sets. The first numerical column shows the
misclassification rate of the best method we found
(mT ), the second shows that of linear discriminant
analysis (mL), the third shows the default rule of as-
signing every point to the majority class (m0) and
the final column shows the proportion of the dif-
ference between the default rule and the best rule
which is achieved by linear discriminant analysis
[(m0 −mL)/(m0 −mT )]. It is likely that the best
rules, being the best of rules which many researchers
have applied, are producing results near the Bayes
error rate.
Table 1
Performance of linear discriminant analysis and the best result we found on ten
randomly selected data sets
Data set Best method e.r. Lindisc e.r. Default rule Prop linear
Segmentation 0.0140 0.083 0.760 0.907
Pima 0.1979 0.221 0.350 0.848
House-votes16 0.0270 0.046 0.386 0.948
Vehicle 0.1450 0.216 0.750 0.883
Satimage 0.0850 0.160 0.758 0.889
Heart Cleveland 0.1410 0.141 0.560 1.000
Splice 0.0330 0.057 0.475 0.945
Waveform21 0.0035 0.004 0.667 0.999
Led7 0.2650 0.265 0.900 1.000
Breast Wisconsin 0.0260 0.038 0.345 0.963
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The striking thing about Table 1 is the large val-
ues of the percentages of classification accuracy gained
by simple linear discriminant analysis. The lowest
percentage is 85% and in most cases over 90% of
the achievable improvement in predictive accuracy,
over the simple baseline model, is achieved by the
simple linear classifier.
I am grateful to Willi Sauerbrei for pointing out
that when the error rates of both the best method
and the linear method are small, the large propor-
tion in achievable accuracy which can be obtained
by the linear method corresponds to the error rate
of the linear method being a large multiple of that
of the best method. For example, in the most ex-
treme case in Table 1, the results for the segmenta-
tion data show that the linear discrimination error
rate is nearly six times that of the best method. On
the other hand, when the error rates are small, this
large difference will correspond to only a small pro-
portion of new data points. Small differences in error
rate are susceptible to the issues raised in Sections 3
and 4: they may vanish when problem uncertainties
are taken into account.
2.4 The Flat Maximum Effect
Even within the context of classifiers defined in
terms of simple linear combinations of the predictor
variables, it has often been observed that the ma-
jor gains are made by (for example) weighting the
variables equally, with only little further gains to
be had by careful optimization of the weights. This
phenomenon has been termed the flat maximum ef-
fect [13, 43]: in general, often quite large deviations
from the optimal set of weights will yield predictive
performance not substantially worse than the opti-
mal weights. An informal argument that shows why
this is often the case is as follows.
Let the predictor variables be (x1, . . . , xd)
T = x
and, for simplicity, assume that E(xi) = 0 and
V (xi) = 1 for i= 1, . . . , d. Let Σ= {r}ij be the cor-
relation matrix between these variables. Now define
two weighted sums
w=
d∑
i=1
wixi and v =
d∑
i=1
vixi,
using respective weight vectors (w1, . . . ,wd) and (v1, . . . , vd).
In general, r(w,v), the correlation between w and v,
can take extreme values of +1 and −1, but suppose
we restrict the weights to be nonnegative, wi, vi ≥ 0
for i= 1, . . . , d, and also require
∑
wi = 1 and
∑
vi =
1. Using these conditions, a little algebra shows that
r(v,w)≥
∑
i
∑
j
viwjr(xi, xj).
Now, with equal weights, vi = 1/d, i= 1, . . . , n, we
obtain
r(v,w)≥
1
d
∑
i
∑
j
wjr(xi, xj)
≥
1
d
∑
i
∑
j
wjr(xi, xk),
where k = argminj r(xi, xj).
From this,
r(v,w)≥
1
d
∑
i
∑
j
wjr(xi, xk)
=
1
d
∑
i
r(xi, xk).
In words, the correlation between an arbitrary weighted
sum of the x variables (with weights summing to
1) and the simple combination using equal weights
is bounded below by the smallest row average of
the entries in the correlation matrix of the x vari-
ables. Hence if the correlations are all high, the sim-
ple average will be highly correlated with any other
weighted sum: the choice of weights will make little
difference to the scores. The gain to be made by the
extra effort of optimizing the weights may not be
worth the effort.
Fig. 2. Effect on misclassification rate of increasing the
number of hidden nodes in a neural network to predict the
class of the sonar data.
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Fig. 3. Effect on misclassification rate of increasing the
number of leaves in a tree classifier to predict the class of
the sonar data.
2.5 An Example
As a simple illustration of how increasing model
complexity leads to a decreasing rate of improve-
ment, we fitted models to the sonar data from the
University of California, Irvine (UCI) data base. This
data set consists of 208 observations, 111 of which
belong to the class “metal” and 97 of which belong
to the class “rock.” There are 60 predictor variables.
The data were randomly divided into two parts, and
a succession of neural networks with increasing num-
bers of hidden nodes was fitted to half of the data,
with the other half being used as a test set. The er-
ror rates are shown in Figure 2. The left-hand point,
corresponding to 0 nodes, is the baseline misclassi-
fication rate achieved by assigning everyone in the
test set to the larger class. The error bars are 95%
confidence intervals calculated from 100 networks in
each case. Figure 3 shows a similar plot, but this
time for a recursive partitioning tree classifier ap-
plied to the same data. The horizontal axis shows
increasing numbers of leaf nodes. Standard methods
of tree construction were used, in which a large tree
is pruned back to the requisite number of nodes. In
both of these figures we see the dramatic improve-
ment arising from fitting the first nontrivial model.
This far exceeds the subsequent improvement ob-
tained in any later step.
3. DESIGN SAMPLE SELECTION
Intrinsic to the classical supervised classification
paradigm is the assumption that the data in the
design set are randomly drawn from the same dis-
tribution as the points to be classified in the future.
Sometimes slight variants of the sampling scheme
are used, for example, drawing samples separately
from each class, but the assumption that future points
to be classified are drawn from the same distribu-
tions as the design set is always made. Unfortu-
nately, as we illustrate in this section, there are sev-
eral reasons why this assumption may not be justi-
fied. In fact, as with our suggestion that the com-
mon choice of equal misclassification costs may be
more often inappropriate than appropriate, we sus-
pect that the assumption that the design distribu-
tion is representative of the distribution from which
future points will be drawn is perhaps more often
incorrect than correct.
If the distribution underlying the design data and
that underlying future points to be classified do dif-
fer, then elaborate optimization of the classifier us-
ing the design data may be wasted effort: the per-
formance difference between two classifiers may be
irrelevant in the context of the differences arising
between the design and future distributions. In par-
ticular, we suggest, more sophisticated classifiers,
which almost by definition model small idiosyncrasies
of the distribution underlying the design set, will
be more susceptible to wasting effort in this way:
the grosser features of the distributions (modeled
by simpler methods) are more likely to persist than
the smaller features (modeled by the more elaborate
methods).
3.1 Population Drift
A fundamental assumption of the classical paradigm
is that the various distributions involved do not change
over time. In fact, in many applications this is unre-
alistic and the population distributions are nonsta-
Fig. 4. Evolution of misclassification rate of a classifier built
at the start of the period.
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tionary. For example, it is unrealistic in most com-
mercial applications concerned with human behav-
ior: customers will change their behavior with price
changes, with changes to products, with changing
competition and with changing economic conditions.
Hoadley [21] remarked “the test sample is supposed
to represent the population to be encountered in the
future. But in reality, it is usually a random sample
of the current population. High performance on the
test sample does not guarantee high performance on
future samples, things do change” and “there is al-
ways a chance that a variable and its relationships
will change in the future. After that, you still want
the model to work. So don’t make any variable dom-
inant.” He is cautioning against making the model
fit the design distribution too well. The last point
about not making any variable dominant is related
to the flat maximum effect, described above.
Among the most important reasons for changes
to the distribution of applicants are changes in mar-
keting and advertising practices. Changes to the dis-
tributions that describe the customers explain why,
in the credit scoring and banking industries [16, 20,
39, 42], the classification rules used to predict which
applicants are likely to default on loans are updated
every few months: their performance degrades, not
because the rules themselves change, but because
the distributions to which they are being applied
change [27].
An example of this is given in Figure 4. The avail-
able data consisted of the true classes (“bad” or
“good”) and the values of 17 predictor variables
for 92,258 customers taking out unsecured personal
loans with a 24-month term given by a major UK
bank during the period 1 January 1993 to 30 Novem-
ber 1997; 8.86% of the customers belonged to the
bad class. The figure shows how the misclassifica-
tion rate for a classification rule built on data just
preceding the start of the displayed period changed
over time. Since the coefficients of the classifier were
not changing, the deterioration in performance must
be due to shifts in the distributions of customers
over time.
An illustration of how this “population drift” phe-
nomenon affects different classifiers differentially is
given in Figure 5. For the purposes of this illustra-
tion we used a linear discriminant analysis (LDA)
as a simple classifier and a tree model as a more
complicated classifier. For the design set we used
customers 1,3,5,7, . . . ,4999. We then applied the
classifiers to alternate customers, beginning with the
second, up to the 60,000th customer. This meant
that different customers were used for designing and
testing, even during the initial period, so that there
would be no overfitting in the reported results. Fig-
ure 5 shows lowess smooths of the misclassification
cost [i.e., misclassification rate, with customers from
each class weighted so that c0/c1 = pi1/pi0, where ci
is the cost of misclassifying a customer from class
i and pii is the prior (class size) of class i]. As can
be seen from the figure, the tree classifier (the lower
curve) is initially superior (has smaller loss), but af-
ter a time its superiority begins to fade. Superficial
examination of the figure might suggest that the ef-
fect takes a long time to become apparent, not re-
ally manifesting itself until around the 40,000th cus-
tomer, but consider that, in an application such as
this, the data are always retrospective. In the present
case, one cannot determine the true class until the
entire 24 month loan term has elapsed. [In fact, of
course, this is not quite true: if a customer defaults
before the end of the term, then their class (bad) is
known, but otherwise their true (good or bad) class
is not known until the end, so that to obtain an unbi-
ased sample, one has to wait until the end. Survival
analysis models can be constructed to allow for this,
but that is leading us away from the point.] For our
problem, to accumulate an unbiased sample of 5000
customers with known true outcome, one would have
to wait until two years after the 5000th customer
had been accepted. In terms of the horizontal axis in
Figure 5, this means that the model would be built,
and would be initially used at around the time that
the 40,000th customer was being considered. The
figure shows that this is just when the model de-
grades. The changes in population structure which
Fig. 5. Lowess smooths of cost-weighted misclassification
rate for a tree model and LDA applied to customers
2,4,6, . . . ,60,000.
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occurred during the two years which elapsed while
we waited for the true classes of the 5000 design set
customers to become known have reduced any ad-
vantage that the more sophisticated tree model may
have.
In summary, the apparent superiority of the more
sophisticated tree classifier over the very simple lin-
ear discriminant classifier is seen to fade when we
take into account the fact that the classifiers must
necessarily be applied in the future to distributions
which are likely to have changed from those which
produced the design set. Since, as demonstrated in
Section 2, the simple linear classifier captures most
of the separation between the classes, the additional
distributional subtleties captured by the tree method
become less and less relevant when the distributions
drift. Only the major aspects are still likely to hold.
The impact of population drift on supervised clas-
sification rules is nicely described by the Ameri-
can philosopher Eric Hoffer, who said, “In times of
change, learners inherit the Earth, while the learned
find themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a
world that no longer exists.”
3.2 Sample Selectivity Bias
The previous subsection considered the impact on
classification rules of distributions which changed
over time. There is little point in optimizing the rule
to the extent that it models aspects of the distribu-
tions and decision surface which are likely to have
changed by the time the rule is applied. Similar futil-
ity applies if a selection process means that the de-
sign sample is drawn from a distribution distorted
in some way from that to which the classification
rule is to be applied. In fact, I suspect that this may
be common. Consider, for example, a classification
rule aimed at differential medical diagnosis or med-
ical screening. The rule will have been developed on
a sample of cases (including members of each class).
Perhaps these cases will be drawn from a particu-
lar hospital, clinic or health district. Now all sorts
of demographic, social, economic and other factors
influence who seeks and is accepted for treatment,
how severe the cases being treated are, how old they
are and so on. In general, it would be risky to as-
sume that these selection criteria are the same for
all hospitals, clinics or health districts. This means
that the fine points of the classification rule are un-
likely to hold. One might expect its coarser features
to be true across different such sets of cases, but
the detailed aspects will reflect particular proper-
ties of the population from which the design data
were drawn. In fact, there are some subtleties here.
Suppose that the classification rule follows the diag-
nostic paradigm [directly modeling p(c|x), the prob-
ability of class membership, c, given the descriptor
vector x], rather than the sampling paradigm [which
models p(c|x) indirectly from the p(x|c) using Bayes’
theorem]. Then if x spans the space of all predictors
of class membership and if the model form chosen
for p(c|x) includes the “true” model, then sampling
distortions based on x alone will not adversely in-
fluence the classifier: the classifier built in one clinic
will also apply elsewhere. Of course, it would be a
brave person who could confidently assert that these
two conditions held. Such subtleties aside, what this
means, again, is that effort spent on overrefining the
classification model is probably wasted effort and,
in particular, that fine differences between different
classification rules should not be regarded as carry-
ing much weight.
This problem of sample selection and how it might
be tackled has been the subject of intensive research,
especially by the medical statistics and economet-
rics communities, but appears not to have been of
great concern to researchers on classification meth-
ods. Having said that, one area that involves sample
selectivity in classification problems which has at-
tracted research interest arises in the retail financial
services industry, as in the previous section. Here, as
in that section, the aim is to predict, for example,
on the basis of application and other background
variables, whether or not an applicant is likely to
be a good customer. Those expected to be good are
accepted, and those expected to be bad are rejected.
For those that have been accepted, we subsequently
discover their true good or bad class. For the re-
jected applicants, however, we never know whether
they are good or bad. The consequence is that the
resulting sample is distorted as a sample from the
population of applicants, which is our real interest
for the future. Measuring the performance or at-
tempting to build an improved classification rule us-
ing those individuals for which we do know the true
class (which is needed for supervised classification)
has the potential to be highly misleading for the
overall applicant population. In particular, it means
that using highly sophisticated methods to squeeze
subtle information from the design data is pointless.
This problem is so ubiquitous in the personal finan-
cial services sector that it has been given its own
name—reject inference [17].
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4. PROBLEM UNCERTAINTY
Section 3 looked at mismatches between the dis-
tributions modeled by the classification rule and the
distributions to which it was applied. This is an ob-
vious way in which things may go awry, but there
are many others, perhaps not so obvious. This sec-
tion illustrates just three.
4.1 Errors in Class Labels
The classical supervised classification paradigm is
based on the assumption that there are no errors
in the true class labels. If one expects errors in the
class labels, then one can attempt to build models
which explicitly allow for this, and there has been
work to develop such models. Difficulties arise, how-
ever, when one does not expect such errors, but they
nevertheless occur.
Suppose that, with two classes, the true posterior
class probabilities are p(1|x) and p(2|x), and that
a (small) proportion δ of each class is incorrectly
believed to come from the other class at each x.
Denoting the apparent posterior probability of class
1 by p∗(1|x), we have
p∗(1|x) = (1− δ)p(1|x) + δp(2|x).
It follows that if we let r(x) = p(1|x)/p(2|x) denote
the true odds and let r∗(x) = p∗(1|x)/p∗(2|x) denote
the apparent odds, then
r∗(x) =
r(x) + ε
εr(x) + 1
(4.1)
with ε= δ/(1− δ).
With small ε, (4.1) is monotonic increasing in
r(x), so that contours of r(x) map to correspond-
ing contours of r∗(x). In particular, if the true op-
timal decision surface is r(x) = k (k is determined
by the relative misclassification costs), then the opti-
mal decision surface when errors are present is given
by r∗(x) = k∗, with k∗ = (k + ε)/(εk +1). Unfor-
tunately, if the occurrence of mislabeling is unsus-
pected, then r∗(x) will be compared with k rather
than k∗. In the case of equal misclassification costs,
so that k = 1, we have k∗ = k = 1, so that no prob-
lems arise from the misclassification. (Indeed, ad-
vantages can even arise: see [9].) However, what hap-
pens if k 6= 1? It is easy to show that r∗(x) > r(x)
whenever r(x)< 1 and that r∗(x)< r(x) whenever
r(x)> 1. That is, the effect of the errors in class la-
bels is to shrink the posterior class odds toward 1, so
that comparing r∗(x) with k rather than k∗ is likely
to lead to worse performance. There is also a sec-
ondary issue, that the shrinkage of r(x) will make
it less easy to estimate the decision surface accu-
rately because it is a flatter surface: the variance
of the estimated decision surface, from sample to
sample, will be greater when there is mislabeling of
classes. In such circumstances it is better to stick to
simpler models, since the higher order terms of the
more complicated models will be very inaccurately
estimated.
4.2 Arbitrariness in the Class Definition
The classical supervised classification paradigm
also takes as fundamental the fact that the classes
are well defined. That is, that there is some fixed
clear external criterion which is used to produce the
class labels. In many situations, however, this is not
the case. In particular, when the classes are defined
by thresholding a continuous variable, then there
is always the possibility that the defining threshold
might be changed. Once again, this situation arises
in consumer credit, where it is common to define a
customer as “defaulting” if they fall three months in
arrears with repayments. This definition, however,
is not a qualitative one (contrast has a tumor/does
not have a tumor) but is very much a quantitative
one. It is entirely reasonable that alternative defini-
tions (e.g., four months in arrears) might be more
useful if economic conditions were to change. This
is a simple example, but in many situations much
more complex class definitions based on logical com-
binations of numerical attributes, split at fairly ar-
bitrary thresholds, are used. For example, student
grades are often based on levels of performance in
continuous assessment and examinations. In detect-
ing vertebral deformities in studies of osteoporosis,
the ranges of the anterior, posterior and mid heights
of the vertebra, as well as functions of these, such as
ratios, are combined in quite complicated Boolean
conditions to provide the definition (e.g., [10]). Def-
initions formed in this sort of way are particularly
common in situations that involve customer man-
agement. For example, Lewis [31] defined a good
account in a revolving credit operation (such as a
credit card) as someone whose billing account shows
(a) on the books for a minimum of 10 months, (b) ac-
tivity in 6 of the most recent 10 months, (c) pur-
chases of more than $50 in at least 3 of the past 24
months and (d) not more than once 30 days delin-
quent in the past 24 months. A bad account is de-
fined as (a) delinquent for 90 days or more at any
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time with an outstanding undisputed balance of $50
or more, (b) delinquent three times for 60 days in the
past 12 months with an outstanding undisputed bal-
ance on each occasion of $50 or more or (c) bankrupt
while the account was open. Li and Hand [32] gave
an even more complicated example from retail bank-
ing.
Our concern with these complicated definitions is
that they are fairly arbitrary: the thresholds used
to partition the various continua are not natural
thresholds, but are imposed by humans. It is entirely
possible that, retrospectively, one might decide that
other thresholds would have been better. Ideally, un-
der such circumstances, one would go back to the
design data, redefine the classes and recompute the
classification rule. However, this requires that the
raw data have been retained at the level of the un-
derlying continua used in the definitions. This is of-
ten not the case. The term concept drift is some-
times used to describe changes to the definitions of
the classes. See, for example, the special issue ofMa-
chine Learning (1998, Vol. 32, No. 2), Widmer and
Kubat [46] and Lane and Brodley [30]. The prob-
lem of changing class definitions has been examined
in [25, 26] and [28].
If the very definitions of the classes may change
between designing the classification rule and apply-
ing it, then clearly there is little point in developing
an overrefined model for the class definition which is
no longer appropriate. Such models fail to take into
account all sources of uncertainty in the problem. Of
course, this does not necessarily imply that simple
models will yield better classification results: this
will depend on the nature of the difference between
the design and application class definitions. How-
ever, there are similarities to the overfitting issue.
Overfitting arises when a complicated model faith-
fully reflects aspects of the design data to the extent
that idiosyncrasies of that data, rather than merely
of the distribution from which the data arose, are
included in the model. Then simple models, which
fit the design data less well, lead to superior clas-
sification. Likewise, in the present context, a model
optimized on the design data class definition is re-
flecting idiosyncrasies of the design data which may
not occur in application data, not because of random
variation, but because of the different definitions of
the classes. Thus it is possible that models which
fit the design data less well will do better in future
classification tasks.
The possibility of arbitrariness in the class defini-
tion discussed in this section is quite distinct from
the possibility of class priors or relative misclassifi-
cation costs being changed—referred to in the quote
from Provost and Fawcett [36] above—but the pos-
sibility of these changes, also, casts doubt on the
wisdom of modeling the problem too precisely, that
is, of using models which are too sophisticated.
4.3 Optimization Criteria and Performance
Assessment
When fitting a model to a design set, one op-
timizes some criterion of goodness of fit (perhaps
modified by a penalization term to avoid overfit-
ting) or of classification performance. Many such
measures are in use, including likelihood, misclas-
sification rate, cost-weighted misclassification rate,
Brier score, log score and area under the ROC curve.
Unfortunately, it is not difficult to contrive data
sets for which different optimization criteria lead to
(e.g.) linear decision surfaces with very different ori-
entations (even to the extent of being orthogonal).
Benton [[2], Chap. 4] illustrated this for several real
data sets. Clearly, then it is important to specify
the criterion to be used when building a classifica-
tion rule. If the use to which the model will be put is
well specified to the extent that a measure of perfor-
mance can be precisely defined, then this measure
should determine the criterion of goodness of fit.
All too often, however, there is a mismatch between
the criterion used to choose the model, the criterion
used to evaluate its performance, and the criterion
which actually matters in real application. For ex-
ample, a common approach might be to use like-
lihood to estimate a model’s parameters, use mis-
classification rate to assess its performance and use
some cost-weighted misclassification rate in practice
(e.g., some combination of specificity and sensitiv-
ity). In circumstances such as these, it would clearly
be pointless to refine the model to a high degree of
accuracy from a likelihood perspective, when this
may be only weakly related to the real performance
objective.
Having said that, one must acknowledge that of-
ten precise details of how performance is to be mea-
sured in the future cannot be given. For example,
in most applications it is difficult to give more than
general statements about the relative costs of differ-
ent kinds of misclassifications. In such cases it might
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be worthwhile to choose a criterion that is equiva-
lent to averaging over a range of possible costs: like-
lihood, the area under a receiver operating charac-
teristic curve and the weighted version of the latter
described in [1] can all be regarded as attempts to
do that.
5. INTERPRETING EMPIRICAL
COMPARISONS
There have been a great many empirical compar-
isons of the performance of different kind of classi-
fication rules. Some of these are in the context of
a new method having been developed and the ef-
fort to gain some understanding of how it performs
relative to existing methods. Other comparisons are
purely comparative studies, seeking to make disin-
terested comparative statements about the relative
merits of different methods. At first glance, such
comparative studies are useful in shedding light on
the different methods, on which generally yield su-
perior performance or on which are to be preferred
for particular kinds of data or in particular domains.
However, on closer examination, such comparisons
have major weaknesses and can even be seriously
misleading. Various authors have drawn attention
to these problems, including Duin [4], Salzberg [40],
Hand [13], Hoadley [21] and Efron [5], so we will
only briefly mention some of the main points here;
in particular, only those points relative to classifi-
cation accuracy, rather than other aspects of per-
formance. Jamain and Hand [24] also gave a more
detailed review of comparative studies of classifica-
tion rules.
Different categories of users might be expected to
obtain different rankings of classification methods
in comparative studies. For example, we can con-
trast an expert user, who will be able to fine-tune
methods, with an inexperienced user, perhaps some-
one who has simply pulled some standard public-
domain software from the web. It would probably
be surprising if their rankings did not differ. More-
over, experts will tend to have particular expertise
with particular classes of method. Someone expert
in neural networks may well achieve superior re-
sults with those methods than with support vec-
tor machines and vice versa. Taken to an extreme,
of course, many comparative studies are made to
establish the performance and properties of newly
invented methods—by their inventors. One might
expect substantial bias in favor of the new methods,
compared to what others might be able to achieve,
in such studies. Duin [4] pointed out the difficulty
of comparing, “in a fair and objective way,” classi-
fiers which require substantial input of expertise (so
that domain knowledge can be taken advantage of )
and classifiers which can be applied automatically
with little external input of expertise. The two ex-
tremes (of what is really a continuum, of course) are
appropriate in different circumstances.
The principle of comparing methods by applying
them to a collection of disparate real data sets is use-
ful, but has its weaknesses. An obvious one is that
different studies use different collections of data sets,
so making comparisons difficult. Furthermore, the
collection will not be representative of real data sets
in any formal sense. Moreover, a potential user is
not really interested in some “average performance”
over distinct types of data, but really wants to know
what will be good for his or her problem, and differ-
ent people have different problems, with data aris-
ing from different domains. A given method may be
very poor on most kinds of data, but very good for
certain problems.
The widespread use of standard collections of data
sets (such as the UCI repository [35]) has clear mer-
its: new methods can be compared with earlier ones
on a level playing field. However, this also means
that there will be some overfitting both to the in-
dividual data sets in the collection and to the col-
lection as a whole. That is, some methods will do
well on data sets in the collection purely by chance.
Indeed, the more successful the collection is in the
sense that more and more people use it for compara-
tive assessments, the more serious this problem will
become.
Jamain and Hand [24] pointed out the difficulty
of saying exactly what a classification “method” is.
Is a neural network with a single hidden node to be
regarded as from the same family as one with an
arbitrary number of hidden nodes? It is clearly not
exactly the same method. Comparative evaluations
using the two models may well yield very different
classification results. It is this sort of phenomenon
which explains why the comparative performance
literature contains many different results for “the
same” methods applied to given public data sets.
Can one then draw general conclusions about the
effectiveness of the method of neural networks? Fur-
thermore, to what extent is preprocessing the data
to be regarded as part of the method? Linear dis-
criminant analysis on raw data may yield very dif-
ferent results from the same model applied to data
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which has been processed to remove skewness. Is,
then, linear discriminant analysis good or bad on
these data? Likewise, is a data set in which miss-
ing values have been replaced by imputed values the
same as a data set in which incomplete records have
been dropped? Applying the same method to the
two variants of the data is likely to yield different
results.
We have already commented that the “accuracy”
of a classification rule can be measured in a wide va-
riety of ways, and that different measures are likely
to yield different performance rankings of classifiers.
Given all of the above points, it is not surprising
that different authors have drawn different conclu-
sions about the relative accuracy of different clas-
sifiers. Other commentators have taken things even
further. In the discussion that accompanies [3], Efron
suggested that new methods always look better than
older ones and that complicated methods are harder
to criticize than simpler ones. He also noted that
it is difficult to make fair comparisons by making
the same effort in applying different methods—a
point made above. Hoadley, in the same discussion,
“coined a phrase called the ‘ping-pong theorem.’
This theorem says that if we revealed to Profes-
sor Breiman the performance of our best model and
gave him our data, then he could develop an algo-
rithmic model using random forests, which would
outperform our model. But if he revealed to us the
performance of his model, then we could develop a
segmented scorecard, which would outperform his
model.”
With so many difficulties in ranking and compar-
ing classifiers, one might naturally have reservations
about small differences in performance—of the kind
generally asserted for the more complicated and so-
phisticated methods over the older and simpler mod-
els.
6. CONCLUSION
In Section 2 we demonstrated that, when build-
ing predictive models of increasing complexity, the
marginal gain from complicated models is typically
small compared to the predictive power of the sim-
ple models. In many cases, the simple models ac-
counted for over 90% of the predictive power that
could be achieved by “the best” model we could find.
Now, in the idealized classical supervised classifica-
tion paradigm, certain assumptions are implicit: it is
assumed that the distributions from which the de-
sign points and the new points are drawn are the
same, that the classes are well defined and the def-
initions will not change, that the costs of different
kinds of misclassification are known accurately, and
so on. In real applications, however, these additional
assumptions will often not hold. This means that
apparent small (laboratory) gains in performance
might not be realized in practice—they may well be
swamped by uncertainties arising from mismatches
between the apparent problem and the real problem.
In particular, many of the comparative studies in
the literature are based on brief descriptions of data
sets, containing no background information at all
on such possible additional sources of variation due
to breakdown of implicit assumptions of the kind
illustrated above. This must cast doubt on the va-
lidity of their conclusions. In general, it means that
deeper critical assessment of the context of the prob-
lem and data should be made if useful practical con-
clusions are to be drawn. If enough is known about
likely additional sources of variability, beyond the
classical sources of sampling variability and model
uncertainty, then more sophisticated models can be
built. However, if insufficient information is known
about these additional sources, which we speculate
will very often be the case, then the principle of par-
simony suggests that it is better to stick to simple
models.
We should note, parenthetically, that there are
also other reasons to favor simple models. Inter-
pretability, in particular, is often an important re-
quirement of a classification rule. Indeed, sometimes
it is even a legal requirement (e.g., in credit scoring).
This leads us to the observation that what one re-
gards as “simple” may vary from user to user: some
might favor weighted sums of predictor values, oth-
ers might prefer (small) tree structures and yet oth-
ers might regard nearest neighbor methods as being
simple.
Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude with the
comment that, by arguing that simple models are
often more appropriate than complex ones and that
the claims of superior performance of the more com-
plex models may be misleading, I am not suggest-
ing that no major advances in classification methods
will ever be made. Such a claim would be absurd in
the face of developments such as the bootstrap and
other resampling approaches, which have led to sig-
nificant advances in classification and other statis-
tical models. All I am saying is that much of the
purported advance may well be illusory. Further-
more, although (almost by definition) one cannot
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predict where the next step-change will come from,
one might venture a guess as to its general area. Re-
sampling methods are children of the computer revo-
lution, as indeed are most other recent developments
in classifier technology [e.g., classification trees, neu-
ral networks, support vector machines, random forests,
multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) and
practical Bayesian methods]. Since progress in com-
puter hardware is continuing, one might reasonably
expect that the advances will arise from more pow-
erful data storage and processing ability.
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